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Kazuaki Sono

Restoration of the Rule of Reason in
Contract Formation: Has There

Been Civil and Common
Law Disparity?

The drafters of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980)1 [hereinafter "Convention"]
2
sought to strike a compromise between civil law and common law.
The Convention avoids using the shorthand of legal rules that
might be interpreted differently in different legal systems. Instead it
speaks directly to the business community by providing the results that
would meet the ordinary expectations of a business person. In general,
these results are largely the same in each State as would have been produced by the application of domestic laws. 3 This likeness may at first
seem paradoxical, for an analysis of the two legal systems' law of contract seems to reveal sharp differences. The answer seems to lie in the
effect of black-letter rules.
1. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10,

1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in [1980] Y.B. UNCITRAL 151
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1180, and in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter

"Convention"].
2. Cf Rosett, CriticalReflections on the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (1984).

Interestingly, writers analyzing the Convention's compatibility with their own
country's law have taken a result-oriented approach, abandoning analyses that focus
exclusively on legal rules or doctrines. Such writers are themselves following the
encouraging path taken by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL). See Sono, UNCITRAL and the Vienna Sales Convention, 18 INT'L L. 7,
13 (1984). Throughout UNCITRAL's drafting process preceding the diplomatic

conference at Vienna for adoption of the Convention, the drafters, having profitted
from the experience of The Hague Uniform Laws of 1964, stressed the need to avoid
a doctrinal approach. See Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International
Sales Contracts, in

INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1-9 to 1-16 (N. Galston & H. Smit

eds. 1984).
3. No doubt, this similarity of result accounts for the general favor shown to the
Convention by the traditionally dogma-oriented legal profession.
21
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Legal rules, which sometimes include contradictory elements, are
primarily means of reaching fair and equitable results. The problem
with legal rules is that they can come to be regarded as intrinsically binding, thus exerting an influence that reaches far beyond the substantive
reasons motivating their creation. Moreover, when the rule itself
becomes the focus of concentration, it often obscures the contradictory
elements underlying it that were often the very reason why the rule was
first embraced. Worst of all, when two legal systems' doctrines are compared, the existence of these legal rules causes an exaggeration of the
two systems' differences, even though in concrete situations both systems might support the same result. Although Geldart, in his famous
Elements of English Law, wrote that "[1]awyers generally speak of law;
laymen more often of laws;"4 lawyers in fact are themselves often guilty
of focusing on the differences among laws, rather than on the common
features of the law as a whole.
The business world is becoming global. Contract-based suits therefore should not produce different results depending on the forum in
which they are initiated, especially where the different societies have
similar goals. The Convention's promoters stressed the common goals
of each legal system, 5 asserting that the Convention restored this underlying similarity in practical contexts. The Convention should not be
examined as a compromise between civil and common law systems; such
an approach would emphasize the very technicalities the Convention
sought to eliminate. This paper will therefore analyze a few examples in
the contract-formation area to show how the Convention, instead of
striking a compromise between the two legal systems, brought to light
the common bases underlying civil law and the common law.
I. The Question of Irrevocability of Offers
The revocability of offers is a common example of the perceived differences in contract formation between civil law and the common law. The
traditional common law rule is that an offer is revocable, even if it states
otherwise, unless the offeree gives the offeror consideration to make the
offer irrevocable or to create an option contract.6 Under civil law, an
offer that states a period of time in which the offeree must accept is not
revocable. If no such period is stated, the offer is irrevocable during a
7
reasonable acceptance period.
Article 16 contains the Convention's approach:
(1) Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation
reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance. (2) However,
4. W. GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAw 1 (1914).
5. See Convention supra note 1, at art. 7 ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application ...").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 comment a.
ZWEIGERT-K6Tz, EIN FHRONG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE
DES PRIVATRECHTS 39 (2d ed. 1984).

6.
7.
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an offer cannot be revoked: (a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed
time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or (b) if it was
reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer
as being irrevocable and the
8
offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.
Lawyers' prevailing attitudes to this provision are as follows. Common
law lawyers consider that the general rule stated in article 16(1) corresponds to the common law. The exceptions to the general rule contained in article 16(2) do not trouble common law lawyers because they
reflect the common law principle of promissory estoppel. Civil law lawyers, on the other hand, consider the exceptions in article 16(2) powerful enough to render nominal the effect of article 16(1)'s general rule.
Therefore, article 16 is satisfactory to both civil and common law lawyers, each side believing that the Convention strikes a compromise
between the two systems that they find workable. However, the question remains: Does the Convention in fact strike a compromise?
Lawyers should not attempt to understand and apply the Convention in terms of their own legal system's doctrines. By so doing, they
will distort the Convention's rules, which in fact are tailored to meet the
reasonable expectations of the business community. If, for example, a
civil law lawyer understands article 16 merely to restate and apply the
traditional civil law rule, the lawyer might believe that an offer is always
irrevocable during the period the contract states for acceptance. Such
an understanding would be wrong. 9 Under the Convention, the crucial
test is the intent of the offeror. 10 The fact that the contract states a
period for acceptance merely creates a rebuttable presumption of
irrevocability.
Suppose an offer is made to a business client that indicates similar
offers have also been made to some of the client's competitors and that
asks the client to advise within a week whether he accepts."I Under the
Convention, whether the one-week period is construed as a period of
irrevocability is determined by looking to the circumstances of the transaction. If, for example, the contents of the offer suggest that the
offeror's intent is to create a "first-come, first served" offer, then the
stated period will not serve to make the offer irrevocable during that
period.
8. Convention supra note 1, at art. 16.
9. Suppose an offer dated September Istates, "If I do not receive your reply of
acceptance by September 15, this offer expires," or more briefly, "Please reply by
September 15." Two questions must be distinguished. One relates to when the offer
lapses. The other relates to the period during which the offer cannot be revoked.
The hypothetical offer is clear on the question of lapse, but it does not answer the
question of irrevocability. Moreover, an offer may lapse at the end of a stated period
of irrevocability or sometime thereafter. However, civil law lawyers often fail to distinguish these two questions. Thus, an abstract legal analysis tends to obscure the
reality of the business world.
10. See art. 8 of the Convention. See also Eorsi, Revocability of Offer, in COMMENTARY
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw: THE

1980

VIENNA SALES CONVENTION

& Bonell eds. 1987).
11. For further discussion of this point, see Part III.
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The need to protect an offeree's reliance is one reason for the traditional civil law rule of irrevocability. Where an offeror induces an
offeree to consider an offer, the offeror should not be permitted to
revoke his offer while the offeree is examining it. Would civil law lawyers enforce this rule even if revocation would do no substantial harm to
the offeree? If the answer is yes, then the value of the traditional,
unshakeable rule becomes questionable, at least from the perspective of
the business community.
Imagine that X, a manufacturer of powerful engines, is aware of Y's
interest in his engines. X writes to Y offering to sell a certain quantity of
specified engines for a stated price and gives Y forty-five days to consider. However, the next day, X changes his mind and writes to Y to
ignore the offer. Assume that Y merely glanced at the first letter and, by
the time he received X's revocation, has done nothing in reliance upon
it. Moreover, assume that because of X's revocation, Y pays no more
attention to X's offer. Assume further that twenty days later Y learns
from a third source that X's offer was a very attractive one. Y thereupon
examines X's offer for the first time, concludes that the offer should not
have been ignored and accepts. Who in the business world would say
2
that X should be bound?'
II.

Offers as "Gifts of Power" To Create A Contract

Contracts are powerful legal devices for maintaining order in business
relationships. An offer is really an offeror's unilateral authorization for
the offeree to create such a contract. Because such offers are often
unsolicited and not supported by consideration, an offer has the charac13
ter of a gift of power.
Both the civil and the common law treat an ordinary promise of a
gift (particularly if oral) as revocable, especially when the promisee has
not yet relied on the promise. t 4 Until the offeree relies, revocation does
not harm the offeree or disturb the status quo. If the two legal systems
12. In this connection, an interesting historical fact may be noted. Under the old
German law, an offer was revocable until the offer was accepted, as in the common
law. However, the strict application of that rule created many instances where it was
felt that some remedy, like the tort-like culpa in contrahendo must be given to the

offeree who suffered substantially by acting in reasonable reliance upon the offer.
Thus, the need to prevent harms from reasonable reliance upon an offer is what
eventually converted that rule to that of the present civil law. This development of
course resembles that of promissory estoppel in the common law. As in the latter's
development, the abstract support given to the current rule emphasizes only the protection of reliance as the rule's basis, rather than emphasizing the original basis of
the rule.
13. An exception is the option contract, where such power is bargained for, or
"purchased."

14. An offer's gift of power may also be applied to a third person's authorization
to act on the authorizer's behalf as an agent. This delegation of authority is revocable at any time, unless the revocation harms the agent or the delegation or agency
has already been coupled with an interest-a situation functionally resembling the
option contract situation.
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agree on this general principle, why should they differ on the revocabil-

ity of an offer? Or do they differ?

M. Civil Law: Irrevocability Linked to Reliance Protection, Not Intent
The tendency in civil law is to regard the black-letter rule of irrevocability as an absolute, even though it is a part of contract law where the will
of the parties controls. When an offer expressly states that it may be
revoked, civil law will of course honor this qualification. But if the offer
does not expressly so state, the civil law often does not attempt to ascertain the intent of the offeror.
The civil law rule of irrevocability is justified when revocation of an
offer causes change in the offeree's position, i.e., where the offeree reasonably relies to his detriment. However, to determine the reasonableness of the offeree's reliance calls for a close scrutiny of the offeror's
intent, to be ascertained from the circumstances of the offer. Even if the
offeree made expenditures to assess the offer and the offer was revoked,
the offeree may nevertheless have incurred expenses at his own risk. 15
The civil law frequently ignores the need for this scrutiny of intent, 16
possibly because the need for such a search was obscured by the rule's
abstract emphasis on the protection of reliance.
It is nevertheless important to distinguish the question of giving
effect to the offeror's intent from the question of protecting reliance.
Many situations do not justify a mechanical application of the rule of
irrevocability: no protection is necessary because there has been no
detrimental reliance. Mechanical application of the black-letter rule
obscures the fact that two distinct questions are involved. The offeror's
intent must reasonably be inferred from the circumstances of the offer.
Then one must ask whether the offeree's reliance on the offer's irrevocability was reasonable and whether the offeree in fact relied to his
detriment.
IV. The Common Law: Why Gilmore Wrote The Death of Contract
The preceding discussion of civil law might cause those living under the
common law to feel greater confidence in their own legal system. However, the common law contains a similar confusion of the questions of
intent and of reliance protection. As discussed separately below, consideration theory gradually became burdened with an impossible dual function, leading ultimately to the enshrinement of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel at the portals of contract law, and a consequent
17
weakening of the importance of intent.
Theories oriented to protecting reliance necessarily emphasize
15. For an example of such an offer, see text accompanying note 11, supra.
16. See supra note 9.

17. Observation of this phenomenon led Grant Gilmore to write
CoNTRAcT (1974).

THE DEATH OF
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objective standards. 18 Promissory estoppel's objective approach analyzes the relationshiparising from a promise, not the contract itself. Many
kinds of relationships arise in private life; a contractual relationship, or a
relationship created through a promise between the promisor and
promisee, is only one of them. Non-contractual relationships essential
to the private order of any society also require reliance. Before getting
on a bus, we do not verify whether the bus has stable tires and a sober
driver. We buy food based on an expectation that it is edible. We enter
classrooms without worrying whether the ceiling might collapse. Such
reliance allows daily life to function smoothly.
Contractual relationships differ from those other examples in that
parties voluntarily enter into a relationship. The same need for reliance
protection exists in contractual as in noncontractual relationships, but in
contractual relationships the law is also concerned with the intent of the
contracting parties. Although honoring the intent of the contracting
parties is itself a principle touching the basic organizational structure of
the international business community, reliance protection does not necessarily stem from this organizational structure associated with the
intent. This difference is crucially important.
When a promise induces reasonable reliance that causes damage to
the other party, the damage must be cured. Society does not permit the
promisor to escape by asserting that a different intention was behind the
promise if that intention cannot reasonably be inferred from the circumstances. He will be estopped from asserting it. Estoppel is thus a oneway "sanction" against the party who otherwise disturbed the social
order, resembling the tort of misrepresentation more than it does contract law. However, reliance-based, objective theory seems to ignore the
origin of this sanction, generalizing about the sanction as if it resulted
from the contract itself.
Societies under both the common law and civil law have tended
constantly to group together as contracts most of the private relationships created through the will of a party. 19 This tendency may have
given rise to the confusions between, and mingling of, the concepts of a
contract and a contractual relationship. Even worse, the legal effects
arising from a contract, and those from the contractual relationship,have
often been grouped together, without distinction, in discussions of contract law and attempts to systematize it. The law of contract (or more
properly, perhaps, the law relating to a promise) requires the subjective
test of intent. The objective test maintains order in many kinds of non18. This impression may have been caused by the fact that judicial decisions were
rendered only around those cases where protection was requested.
19. For example, the so-called unilateral contract is not a contractual agreement
in that the promisor's promise is unilateral, and his obligation to perform is only
subject to the fulfillment of a condition which he himself imposed. Nevertheless, it
creates a contract-like relationship. And, as discussed in Part II, even in the ordinary
offer-and-acceptance relationship,an offer is a unilateral promise in the sense that the
offeror's obligation to perform his promise is subject to the fulfillment of a condition,
i.e., the offeree's promise in return.
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contractual private relationships, both contractual and non-contractual,
and is thus more akin to the law of such torts as misrepresentation. An
unnecessary confusion ensues when these two tests are compared and
discussed as if they belong to the same dimension.
V. Consideration Theory Burdened by an Impossible Dual Function
The above-noted confusion occurred under the common law because of
developments surrounding the theory of consideration. Not all
promises are necessarily legally enforceable. Society sanctions breaches
of promise in ways other than by legal sanctions, as, for example, by the
loss of reputation. For a promise to be legally binding, the promisor's
intent in making a promise must be so firm and serious that it can reasonably be inferred that he is prepared to accept legal sanction in case of
breach and, therefore, that leaving the breach thereof legally unsanctioned would disturb the social order. The exchange of consideration
had originally been one test of the seriousness of the promisor's subjective intent. Another such test was whether a promise was under seal.
The use of consideration expanded, however, as a convenient tool
to justify legal interventions to protect parties. This process of expansion culminated in the holding that a detriment suffered by a promisee is
consideration, even when the promise had not conferred any benefit
upon the promisor. By this point, the central concern had become protecting the promisee's reliance. Therefore, before "consideration was
found," an objective test had to be imported to assess whether the
promisee's acts or detriments in reliance on a promise were reasonable.
Consideration's original role had thus been transformed from that of a
guide to the promisor's intent to now also disposing of the question of
the promisee's reasonableness in relying on the promise. It seemed an
impossible dual function.
This tendency to reliance protection led to the enshrinement of
promissory estoppel in the Restatement of Contract, Section 90.20 Curiously, over time the commentators had forgotten that the reliance-protective approach was only a one-way street that allowed a party in need
of protection to sanction the other party. Perhaps it was the accumulation of judicial decisions that created the impression that courts were
protecting the legal effect of a promise itself.2 ' Regardless, the need for
protection in fact arose, not from the contract, but from the relationship
in a particular situation, and protection was afforded only when acting in
reliance upon this relationship would substantially disturb the status
20. Indeed, by the time the American Law Institute enacted the Restatement Second, the process had advanced so far that the drafters declared in comment a that the
rule will "often render inquiry unnecessary as to the precise scope of the policy of
enforcing bargains."
21. When used successfully, such theories can obscure those focusing on the subjective standard of ascertaining intent.
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Article 16(2)(a) of the Convention has restored the importance of
searching for the offeror's intent. Article 16(a) also reflects an offer's
unilateral empowerment of the offeree. Article 16(2)(b) recognizes the
need for reliance protection in the business setting where the offeree's
reliance on the offer's irrevocability was reasonable under the circumstances and the offeree has already acted in reliance on the offer. The
soundness of this solution should be apparent to all business people,
regardless of legal doctrine.
VI.

Time When Contract Becomes Concluded

The issue of the permissibility of withdrawing an acceptance merits
attention, for it, too, is a problem area where, in both the civil and common law systems, doctrine often disturbs proper thinking. Adams v.
Lindsell,2 3 and Byrne v. Leon van Tienhoven & Co.,24 are commonly
believed to have established the rule. Although the real issue in these
cases was whether an offer could still be revoked after an acceptance had
been dispatched, the rule established by the cases is that a contract is
formed at the time an acceptance is dispatched. This rule of contract
formation is so firmly established that it overrides the offeree's ability to
withdraw acceptance before the acceptance has been received by the
offeror, even though such a result falls outside the logic of what motivated the rule's formation.
In the civil law, the situation is similar. For example, article 526(1)
of the Japanese Civil Code provides that a contract is formed when an
acceptance is dispatched. However, an examination of its traveau
preparatoirereveals that the rule's rationale was to preclude revocation of
an offer when it might reach the offeree after the offeree's acceptance is
dispatched. Thus a broad rule was established to catch a relatively small
fish, and once created it caused more problems than it solved, inviting
sophisticated legal discussions similar to those that have taken place in
25
the common law countries.
The Convention does not follow such an approach. Article 16(1)
clearly states that revocation of an offer will no longer be permitted after
an acceptance is dispatched. Article 18(2), however, adds that the
acceptance will not become effective until it reaches the offeror. Thus,
according to article 22 the acceptance may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the offeror before the acceptance or at the same time as
the acceptance would otherwise have become effective.
22. These developments were exactly what Gilmore attacked with humor and
irony in his THE DEATH oF CoNTRAcT.
23. 1 Barnewall & Anderson 681 (K.B. 1818).
24. 49 L.J.C.P. 316, L.R. 5 C.P.D. 344 (1880).
25. See MacNeil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problemsfor a Single Rule, 112 U. PA.

L. REV. 947, 952-79 (1964). It may also be of interest to note that Adams v. Lindsell
and Byrne v. Leon van Tienhoven & Co. were relied upon at the time of the Japanese
codification in support of the rule.
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As discussed earlier, upon receiving an offer, the offeree has the
power to create a contract by acceptance. The offeree is under no duty
to accept the offer. By dispensing with an all-embracing rule on the time
of the contract's formation, the Convention takes into account this voluntary aspect of an acceptance. When an acceptance reaches the
offeror, the acceptance will become effective and will simultaneously be
merged into a contract. By permitting withdrawal of an acceptance
before its receipt, the offeror does not lose anything he deserves, but the
status quo of the parties' relationship is preserved.
VII.

Neither Civil Nor Common Law Prevailed: A Road to
Delocalization of Law

Under both civil law and the common law, many black-letter rules that
have developed are, at best, the product of continuously accumulated
human experiences of how to reach fair and equitable results. The law
is not a mere series of such rules-the law is above them. Lawyers' technical expertise, however, often has obscured the fact that these rules are
only guides for applying the law. The Convention liberates the business
community from the jungle of technicalities and restored the rule of
reason.
These practical rules remain part of a traditional convention,
reflecting the reality of a world where any contract dispute arising from
an international transaction will ultimately have to be decided by the
application of the law of a particular State. Thus, the drafters desired
the "unification" of each national law. However, the Convention's success in identifying solutions acceptable to the business world provides
hope that the Convention will establish a foundation for the delocalization of the law. The age of independence, or even interdependence, has
already gone and we are now in the age of interpenetration, where
national boundaries lose their meaning. 26 For a global legal order to be
established to govern business transactions "ignorant" of national
boundaries, such a legal order must first free the business world from
the dogmas that heretofore have shaped the traditional local orders.
This is a road for the restoration of ex marcatoria,in the same manner as
it existed in the medieval age, at a global dimension in relation to the so27
called "international" transactions.
26. See Sono, Sovereignty, This Strange Thing: Its Impact on Global Economics, Ga.J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 9 549 (1979).

27. In this connection, the increasing popularity of commercial arbitration at the
expense of national judicial tribunals may also help to restore the lex marcatoria. The
recent judicial favor towards expanding the scope of arbitrability of international disputes, including even issues, such as anti-monopoly laws, that touch upon a State's
public policies, will further strengthen this trend. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Commercial arbitrations by
their nature are unconnected with the exercise of sovereignty, and they will often
lead to applying the underlying commercially reasonable result as understood in
transactions of a global dimension. The Convention on the Limitation Period in the
International Sale of Goods (New York, 1974), which deals with problems of the stat-
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ute of limitation or prescription and their international effects, already treats arbitrations at the same level as ordinary judicial proceedings. Art. 1(3)(e). This
Convention entered into force on August 1, 1988.

